

Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

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Z 161310Z MAR 74 ZFF 4

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8776

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 03361

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN

E.O. 11652; XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, UK, EC

SUBJECT: SONNENFELDT/HARTMAN CONSULTATIONS WITH
FOREIGN SECRETARY CALLAGHAN

1. SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN CALLED ON FOREIGN SECRETARY CALLAGHAN AT THE FCO MARCH 15. CALLAGHAN HAD WITH HIM MINISTERS OF STATE ENNALS AND HATTERSLEY, PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY BRIMELOW, AND OTHER SENIOR FCO OFFICIALS. CHARGE AND EMBASSY OFFICERS WERE ALSO PRESENT. DISCUSSIONS CENTERED MAINLY ON THE BRITISH APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, US-EC RELATIONS AND INTENTIONS OF NEW BRITISH GOVERNMENT TOWARD DEFENSE. ATMOSPHERE WAS EXTREMELY CORDIAL. CALLAGHAN SHOWED MARKED GOOD WILL TOWARD THE US AND INDICATED HIS FIRM INTENTION TO ENSURE THAT US-UK AND US-EC RELATIONS ARE PUT ON THE BEST POSSIBLE FOOTING.

2. UK AND THE COMMUNITY - CALLAGHAN SAID THAT THERE ARE TWO ASPECTS OF BRITISH APPROACH TO THE COMMUNITY. FIRST IS THE COMMITMENT OF THE LABOR GOVERNMENT TO UNDERTAKE A FUNDAMENTAL RENEGOTIATION OF ITS MEMBERSHIP. THE SECOND IS THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE COMMUNITY. HMG WILL NOT LEAVE AN EMPTY CHAIR IN THE EC. THEY WANT TO GET INTO DISCUSSIONS. ON MARCH 19 DURING THE FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, CALLAGHAN
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WILL PUBLICLY SPELL OUT THE THINKING OF THE BRITISH

GOVERNMENT. HE SAID HE IS AN AGNOSTIC WHERE THE EC IS CONCERNED. BASICALLY, UK GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT WERE NOT SATISFACTORY TO BRITAIN AND MUST BE RENEGOTIATED. CALLAGHAN INTENDS TO PROCEED ON A SUBJECT BY SUBJECT BASIS. SEVERAL MATTERS ARE OF PRIME IMPORTANCE TO THE UK: (A) ACCESS TO THE BRITISH MARKET BY GOODS OF THIRD COUNTRIES. IN THIS CONNECTION HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE ERA OF CHEAP FOOD WAS NECESSARILY PAST. WITH TWO GOOD WORLD HARVESTS THIS YEAR AND NEXT, FOOD PRICES MIGHT WELL COME DOWN. (B) BRITAIN'S FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMMUNITY BUDGET WAS TOO HIGH AND MUST BE REDUCED. (C) THE EC TREATMENT OF LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER THE TREATY OF ACCESSION WOULD HAVE TO BE AMENDED, ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT THAT MIGHT BE NECESSARY. BRITAIN WOULD NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH, AND HE HOPED BRITAIN'S PARTNERS TOO WOULD NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH. AS TO THE SECOND ASPECT OF THE COMMUNITY, NAMELY, ITS POLITICAL DIMENSION, HE SAID, "WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN AN ANTI-AMERICAN DIRECTION." HIS OWN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE COMMUNITY WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE KIND OF POLITICAL OUTLOOK IT ADOPTED. TURNING TO NEXT STEPS, CALLAGHAN SAID THAT AT THE APRIL 1 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING HE WOULD CLEARLY EXPRESS THE FOREGOING PHILOSOPHY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, AND THEN HE WOULD EXPECT TO GET DOWN TO DETAILED RENEGOTIATION. EXPANDING ON HIS BASIC PHILOSOPHY TOWARD THE COMMUNITY, CALLAGHAN SAID THAT HE WELCOMED THE CONTRIBUTION IT HAD MADE TO FRANCO-GERMAN RECONCILIATION -- IT HAD "TRANSFERRED THE BATTLEFIELDS TO THE CHAMBER COUNCIL." HE INDICATED THAT IF THE ILLUSION OF COOPERATION WITHIN EUROPE WERE BROKEN, THE CONSEQUENCES COULD BE VERY SERIOUS. CONCLUDING HIS PRESENTATION, CALLAGHAN SAID THE UK NEEDS A FAIR BARGAIN AND THE EC MUST DEVELOP GOOD RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE US. HIS GOVERNMENT WAS COMMITTED TO PUTTING THE RESULTS OF THEIR RENEGOTIATION TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE TO TEST THEIR OPINION. THIS WOULD BE DONE.

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3. SONNENFELDT EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE BRITISH RECEIVING HIM AND HARTMAN, AND SAID THEY WERE HAPPY TO PICK UP THE THREADS OF COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION WITH THIS GOVERNMENT. HE NOTED THAT THE US CONTINUED TO BELIEVE IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE UK TO BE IN THE COMMUNITY, AMONG OTHER REASONS FOR THE WORLD VIEW IT BROUGHT TO THE COMMUNITY. HE SAID WE THEREFORE APPLAUD EXDIS

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

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WHAT CALLAGHAN HAD SAID ABOUT THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE COMMUNITY. HARTMAN OBSERVED THAT THE UK WOULD NOT BE ALONE IN ITS EFFORTS IN SEEKING CHANGES. HOWEVER, IF THE UK WERE TO PROCEED AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMUNITY, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO FIND SUPPORT. HARTMAN STRESSED THAT THE US SAW NO INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A EUROPEAN ENTITY ON THE ONE HAND AND AN OUTWARD-LOOKING EC AND GOOD ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS ON THE OTHER.

4. THE DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE EC. SONNENFELDT SAID THE US DOES NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT A CLOSER ORGANIC CONSULTATIVE PROCESS WITH THE US DEROGATES FROM EC IDENTITY. WHEN CALLAGHAN ASKED WHEREIN THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS FELL SHORT, HARTMAN AND SONNENFELDT SPELLED OUT FULLY US CRITICISMS. SONNENFELDT NOTED THAT IN BOTH MECHANICS AND THE DRIFT OF EC DECISIONS, THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS WAS UNSATISFACTORY. IN RESPONSE, OLIVER WRIGHT STATED THE WELL-KNOWN VIEWS OF THE EC NINE ABOUT THE MECHANICAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS, STRESSING THAT POLITICAL COOPERATION WITHIN THE NINE WAS IN ITS EARLY STAGES. HE ACCEPTED AS FAIR CRITICISM THAT THE CONSULTATION PROCEDURES WERE INADEQUATE AND SHOULD BE IMPROVED. BUT HE HOPED THE US WOULD BE PATIENT WHILE AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO IMPROVE THEM. THE UK WAS CONSCIOUS THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT FACET OF THE EC NINE

POLITICAL COOPERATION WAS THE US CONNECTION. CALLAGHAN
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EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECT ON THE UK'S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE US OF EC NINE ATTEMPTS TO ARRIVE AT COLLECTIVE POSITIONS. HE WAS WORRIED THAT US-UK RELATIONS MIGHT WITHER ON THE VINE. AFTER WRIGHT HAD FURTHER EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND OF THE EC NINE JAPANESE DISCUSSIONS OF A DECLARATION AND THE NOVEMBER 5 DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, CALLAGHAN OBSERVED THAT ALL THIS POINTED UP THE NATURE OF THE DILEMMA. HE THOUGHT THAT IF THE NINE WERE SUCCESSFUL IN REACHING COLLECTIVE POSITIONS, THE IMPACT ON US POLICY WOULD BE GREATER. INDIVIDUALLY, THE EC NINE COUNTRIES HAVE MINOR INFLUENCE WITH THE US. TO THIS, SONNENFELDT SAID THAT THE BRITISH SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE US. HE CONTINUED THAT THERE WILL BE TIMES WHEN THE US AND THE EC NINE WILL DIFFER BUT HE HOPED OUR RESPECTIVE ATTITUDES WOULD NOT BECOME COMPETITIVE OR ANTAGONISTIC. IF DIFFERENCES DID OCCUR, THEY COULD BE MINIMIZED BY FULL PRIOR DISCUSSION. CALLAGHAN INTERJECTED THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS ABSURD FOR THE NINE TO DEAL WITH THE US BY PASSING ITS DOCUMENTS TO THE US SURREPTITIOUSLY.

5. CALLAGHAN ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS AN EFFECTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND PARIS. SONNENFELDT SAID THAT THE DIALOGUE WAS STEADILY DECAYING. BEGINNING IN 1969, THE US HAD TRIED HARD TO HEAL THE RIFT IN US-FRENCH RELATIONS, AND THERE HAD BEEN A CALCULATED US POLICY TO PLACATE THE FRENCH EVEN IN THE FACE OF EUROPEAN CRITICISM THAT WE WERE REWARDING FRANCE FOR BAD BEHAVIOR.

CALLAGHAN OBSERVED THAT THE UK DID NOT WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FRANCE'S GROWING ISOLATION, AND HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO FORCE FRANCE INTO FURTHER ISOLATION. IT WOULD BE THE UK'S OBJECTIVE TO TRY TO INCREASE POLITICAL COOPERATION AMONG THE NINE, INTERJECTING THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD NO DIFFICULTIES WITH THE IDEA OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE NINE BEING IN PARIS. ONCE AGAIN HE SAID THAT POLITICAL COOPERATION IN THE NINE CANNOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF UK BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THE US. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT THE US BE ABLE TO
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INSERT ITS VIEWS INTO THE EC NINE PROCESS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT AND HE WAS QUITE PREPARED TO LET THE FRENCH KNOW THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO SECRETS FROM THE US IN MATTERS OF MUTUAL CERN. CONSULTATION WOULD NO LONGER BE SURREPTITIOUS BUT FULL AND ABOVE THE TABLE. THE US, HE CONCLUDED, IS ESSENTIAL TO THE DEFENSE OF THE WEST AND EUROPE CANNOT PARATE POLITICAL COOPERATION FROM DEFENSE MATTERS.

6. US-EC NINE DECLARATION - ASKED BY CALLAGHAN TO DESCRIBE WHERE MATTERS STOOD ON THE EC NINE DECLARATION, SONNENFELDT SAID THAT THE US IS TRYING TO RESOLVE A DILEMMA. WE HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE FIRST PART OF THE DECLARATION WHICH IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY BALANCED; IT STRESSES MORE HEAVILY US RECOGNITION OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY THAN A COOPERATIVE US-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP. EXDIS

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

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THE CONSULTATIVE ASPECT, HOWEVER, IS MORE DIFFICULT. THE LANGUAGE NOW IN THE DRAFT IS INSUFFICIENT TO DESCRIBE AN ORGANIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO ATTEMPT TO SPELL IT OUT WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES AND POSSIBLY AN 8 TO 1 SPLIT. WERE WE TO ACCEPT WHAT IS NOW IN THE DOCUMENT, WE WOULD BE GLOSSING OVER THE REAL ISSUES, AND WE CANNOT CLAIM THAT THERE IS GOOD CONSULTATION WHERE NONE EXISTS. THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER WE SHOULD PURSUE THE EC NINE-US DECLARATION AT ALL. A DECISION ON THIS WILL BE TAKEN SHORTLY BY THE USG. IF IT SEEMED PREMATURE

TO TRY TO PUT DOWN ON PAPER WHAT WE HOPED WILL DESCRIBE GOOD US-EC RELATIONS, IT MIGHT BE BEST TO STOP AND LET THE PRACTICAL PROCESS GO ON UNTIL SUCH TIME AS WE CAN FIND WORDS TO DESCRIBE THE REAL SITUATION.

7. DEFENSE - CALLAGHAN SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE REDUCTIONS IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN THE BUDGET WHEN IT IS PRESENTED LATER THIS MONTH. HOWEVER, THE CUTS WOULD BE "RELATIVELY SMALL." THE BASIC APPROACH OF HMG ON DEFENSE WILL BE TO LOOK AT BRITISH COMMITMENTS TO SEE WHICH CAN BE CURTAILED WITHOUT DIMINISHING SECURITY. THE LABOR GOVERNMENT IS PLEDGED TO MAKE DEFENSE CUTS, AND THE BRITISH ELECTORATE WANTS TO SEE REDUCTIONS. HE NOTED THAT SOME ELEMENTS IN THE LABOR PARTY BELIEVE THAT THE PERCENTAGE OF BRITISH GNP DEVOTED TO DEFENSE IS TOO HIGH IN RELATION TO THAT OF OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. TURNING TO THE US POLARIS
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BASE AT HOLY LOCH, CALLAGHAN POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS PRESSURE WITHIN THE LABOR PARTY ON THE GOVERNMENT FOR REMOVAL OF THE BASE. CALLAGHAN SAID FLATLY THAT HE WOULD NOT YIELD TO THIS PRESSURE. THE LINE HE TOOK IN THE SHADOW CABINET AND NOW PROPOSES TO TAKE IS THAT THE UK IS WILLING TO PUT THE HOLY LOCH ISSUE INTO MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS. IF WE (AND BY THIS WE ASSUME HE MEANS THE US AND NATO) CAN GET AN EQUIVALENT PRICE FROM THE EAST FOR HOLY LOCH, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE IT GO BUT ONLY ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE WEST WOULD BE NO LESS SECURE AT THE END OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. HE SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD APPROACH THE WHOLE QUESTION OF HOLY LOCH AND, BY IMPLICATION, DISARMAMENT SLOWLY. SONNENFELDT RESPONDED THAT THE USG HOPES REDUCTIONS IN THE BRITISH DEFENSE EFFORT WILL BE MINIMAL AND WILL NOT SET OFF A CHAIN REACTION IN EUROPE OR THE US. NOTING THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE POSTURE AND DETENT, SONNENFELDT SAID THAT WE HOPE THE UK DEFENSE EFFORT WHICH WE VALUE WILL REMAIN STRONG. TO THIS CALLAGHAN SAID CATEGORICALLY "I AGREE WITH YOU." HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF THIS GOVERNMENT CAN GET ITS OWN ECONOMIC SITUATION RIGHT, THEN THE UK WOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO STRENGTHEN ITS EFFORTS IN NATO. "THERE IS NO PACIFIST MOOD IN HMG, BUT WE MUST TRY TO GET OUR ECONOMIC POSITION RIGHT EVEN IF IT MEANS A TEMPORARY CUTBACK IN DEFENSE." WHEN CALLAGHAN POINTED OUT THAT LABOR HAD FOUGHT THE ELECTION ON, INTER ALIA, GROUNDS OF REDUCING EXPENDITURES FOR DEFENSE, SONNENFELDT OBSERVED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT IN MBFR TO PRESERVE THE INCENTIVES FOR THE SOVIETS TO REDUCE. THEREFORE

THE WEST SHOULD DO NOTHING HASTY. THE US WANTS TO
PROCEED SLOWLY AND SYSTEMATICALLY WITHIN AN OVERALL
CONCEPT (COMMON CEILING) WHICH WOULD INSURE THAT THERE
WOULD NOT BE MINDLESS DEFENSE REDUCTIONS.
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8. US/SOVIET RELATIONS - CALLAGHAN INQUIRED ABOUT THE
US ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. SONNENFELDT
EXPLAINED THAT THE SECRETARY'S APRIL 23 SPEECH WAS IN
PART THE PRODUCT OF AN ATTEMPT TO REFUTE ALLEGATIONS OF
AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE A CONDIMINIUM BETWEEN THE US AND
USSR. US/SOVEIT RELATIONS, HE SAID, WERE SPECIAL ONLY
IN THE SENSE THAT THE US AND USSR ARE THE TWO STRONGEST
POWERS IN THE WORLD AND HAVE A COMMON STAKE IN SURVIVAL.
THE US HAS REPEATEDLY SAID THAT IT WOULD BE ALIEN TO
OUR OWN PHILOSOPHY TO ENGAGE IN COLLUSION WITH THE USSR.
IN WORKING OUT THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF
NUCLEAR WAR FOR EXAMPLE WE HAD BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED,
AS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT KNEW, ABOUT THE INTERESTS OF
OUR ALLIES, AND THIS IS WHY WE WERE SO BAFLED ABOUT THE
FRENCH PUTTING IT ABOUT THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN
REACHED AT THE EXPENSE OF OUR ALLIES. HE HOPED EUROPE
WOULD SEE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS AN
EFFORT TO COOPERATE ON SURVIVAL, TO REMOVE DANGERS, TO
INFLUENCE SOVEIT EXTERNAL BEHAVIOR AND (ALTHOUGH WE DO
NOT SAY SO PUBLICLY) INFLUENCE SOME KIND OF CHANGE IN
SOVIET VALUES. THE WHOLE NOTION OF THE YEAR OF EUROPE WAS

TO MAKE CLEAR THE FUNDAMENTAL PRIORITY WHICH ATLANTIC
RELATIONS HAVE AND WHICH WE CONSIDER A PRECONDITION
TO ANY DETENTE WITH THE USSR. AS LONG AS PRESIDENT
NIXON IS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, OUR RELATIONS
WITH EUROPE WOULD BE HIGHER IN OUR SCALE OF VALUES THAN
OUR DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BRIMELOW CONFIRMED
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SONNENFELDT'S STATEMENT ON THE NUCLEAR WAR AGREEMENT.
9. THE DISCUSSION ENDED WITH CALLAGHAN ASKING
SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN TO TELL THE SECRETARY HOW
GRATEFUL HE WAS THAT THEY HAD COME TO LONDON.
10. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, NEGOTIATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 MAR 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974LONDON03361
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: LONDON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740337/aaaabird.tel
Line Count: 403
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <24 APR 2002 by ifshinsr>; APPROVED <31 JAN 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SONNENFELDT/HARTMAN CONSULTATIONS WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY CALLAGHAN
TAGS: PFOR, UK, EEC
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005